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While India boasts a world-class equity market and increasingly important bank assets, its bond 
market has not kept up. The government bond market remains illiquid. The corporate bond 
market, in addition, remains restrictive to participants and largely arbitrage-driven. Securitization, 
which once had the jump on other Asian markets, has failed to take off.  
To meet the needs of its firms and investors, the bond market must therefore evolve. This will 
mean creating new market sectors such as exchange-traded interest rate and foreign exchange 
derivatives contracts. It will mean relaxing exchange restrictions, easing investment mandates 
on contractual savings institutions, reforming the stamp duty tax, and revamping disclosure 
requirements for corporate public offers. This paper reviews the development and outlook of the 
Indian bond market. It looks at the market participants—including life insurance, pension funds, 
mutual funds and foreign investors—and it discusses the importance to development of learning 
from the innovations and experiences of others. 
 
Keywords: India, emerging East Asia, bond market, securitization, collateralized borrowing and 
lending obligations (CBLO) 
 





The Indian financial system is changing fast, marked by strong economic growth, more robust 
markets, and considerably greater efficiency. But to add to its world-class equity markets, and 
growing banking sector, the country needs to improve its bond markets. While the government 
and corporate bond markets have grown in size, they remain illiquid. The corporate market, in 
addition, restricts participants and is largely arbitrage-driven. 
 
To meet the needs of its firms and investors, the bond market must therefore evolve. This will 
mean creating new market sectors such as exchange traded interest rate and foreign exchange 
derivatives contracts. It will need a relaxation of exchange restrictions and an easing of 
investment mandates on contractual savings institutions to attract a greater variety of investors 
(including foreign) and to boost liquidity. Tax reforms, particularly stamp duties, and a revamping 
of disclosure requirements for corporate public offers, could help develop the corporate bond 
market. And streamlining the regulatory and supervisory structure of the local currency bond 
market could substantially increase efficiency, spurring innovation, economies of scale, liquidity 
and competition. Such reforms will help level the playing field for investors.  
 
In deciding the course for reform, however, the innovations and experiences of markets in the 
region are also important. Developing markets often mimic more advanced European and North 
American markets. But complex structures designed for diverse developed markets are 
sometimes ill-suited to less-developed economies. Instead, looking to neighboring, emerging 
markets at similar stages of development can be more useful. For example, India’s unique 
collateralized borrowing and lending obligations (CBLO) system and its successful electronic 
trading platform could usefully be studied by its neighbors, many of which suffer from limited 
repo markets or which have (like India) tried unsuccessfully to move bonds on to electronic 
platforms. India could benefit, by contrast, from the lessons of its neighbors in developing its 
corporate bond market.  
 
This paper reviews these issues and discusses policies that can help further develop India’s 
debt market. Section II highlights and compares market development and outlook to emerging 
East Asian economies. Sections III and IV summarize salient characteristics, reforms and 
obstacles. Section V discusses the development and prospects for India’s securitization market. 
Section VI looks at the main market participants and the depth of the pool of available investors, 
arguably the most significant factor in market development. Section VII tackles policy issues. 




II.  Development and Outlook: Illiquid and Lagging, but Growing 
 
India’s economy has expanded an average of about 8.5% annually for the past 4 years, driven 
by rising productivity and investment. After rising sharply in early 2007, inflation has ebbed, and 
the current account deficit has moderated. India’s bright prospects have attracted record capital 
inflows, even amid heightened global uncertainty and slowing growth in the United States (US). 
 
The Indian financial system is now in a process of rapid transformation marked by strong 
economic growth, increased market robustness, and a considerable increase in efficiency.
1 
                                                           
1  ADB has disbursed loans and technical assistance to develop India’s capital market in areas that include regulation and 
supervision of derivative instruments, development of secondary debt market, and development and reform of mutual fund 
industry, among others.  
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Bank and financial intermediation, however, remain undeveloped with respect to lending and 
deposits, and most banks remain largely controlled by public sector institutions, limiting the 
development of a true credit culture, the skills to assess credit risks, and a willingness to 
accommodate any but the lowest risk borrowers. 
 
Overseas investors bought a net USD19.5 billion of stocks and bonds during 2007, compared 
with the previous record of USD8.9 billion in 2006. The current year has seen net outflows in the 
first 9 months totaling USD6.9 billion. The bank rate is currently 6% (July 2008) and longer-term 
deposit rates have risen around 50 basis points (bp) to 9.55% in recent months. Real estate 
markets have been buoyant, although they have cooled recently, and the banking system 
remains sound and well capitalized. In March 2008, the capital adequacy ratio stood at 13.1%, 
well above the 8% minimum prescribed under the Basel I accord. Amid strong credit growth, the 
ratio of scheduled commercial banks’ gross nonperforming loans (NPLs) to advances has fallen 
to 2.4% in March 2008 from 10.4% in March 2002.
2  
 
India has developed a world-class equities market from relatively unpromising beginnings. Since 
1996, the ratio of equity market capitalization to gross domestic product (GDP) has more than 
trebled to 108% (down from 130% in September 2007), from 32.1% in 1996 (Figure 1). During 
the same period the banking sector expanded to 74% of GDP from 46.5%. In contrast, the 
development of government and corporate bond markets has not been so fast: the bond market 
grew to a more modest 40.0% of GDP, from 21.3%. In March 2008, the government bond 
market represented 36.1% of GDP, compared with the corporate bond market, which amounted 
to just 3.9% of GDP (Table 1). 
 
 

















































               Sources: Data for bonds sourced from Bank for International Settlements; equities from World Federation of  
                               Exchanges; and bank credit from CEIC. 
          
                                                           
2  Source: Banking statistics—RBI Monthly Bulletin: December 2007.  
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           Table 1: India and EEA Bond Markets (% of GDP), March 2008 
 
  Government Corporate  Total 
   China, People’s Rep. of  46.1  4.7  50.8 
   Hong Kong, China  8.7  35.3  44.0 
   Indonesia  17.1  2.0  19.1 
   Korea, Rep. of  48.8  61.8  110.6 
   Malaysia  48.1  37.5  85.6 
   Philippines  33.3  3.5  36.8 
   Singapore  41.2  30.7  72.0 
   Thailand  40.7  15.9  56.6 
   Viet Nam  14.6  2.1  16.7 
   India  36.1  3.9  40.0 
 
               Sources: AsianBondsOnline, Bank for International Settlements, and Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
Trading in derivatives started in 2000 and the Indian market is now the tenth largest in the world 
for futures contracts on single stocks and indexes and the largest for futures on single stocks. 
Commodity markets have also developed. Three new markets were created in 2000, based on 
National Stock Exchange (NSE) architecture. However, of the 94 commodities traded, gold and 
silver account for half of turnover: by 2006 India had become home to the world’s third largest 
derivative market for gold. 
 
With the strong growth in equity markets, at a time when India’s GDP has itself been increasing 
more rapidly, it is similar in terms of % of GDP to Korea and relatively larger than other 
emerging East Asia equity markets, with the exception of Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and 
Malaysia (Figure 2). Equity trading languished in the early 2000s, when world equity markets 
were falling and Indian government debt was rising strongly, but has risen since. 
 
As is common in the region, India is a bank-dominated market (Figure 3), and the relative 
importance of bank assets as a percentage of GDP has continued to grow—partly as banking 
penetration has deepened with financial liberalization, and partly as a result of the ongoing need 
for deficit financing. However, the ratio of bank assets to GDP is still low by comparison with 
other emerging East Asian economies, indicating that India still has some way to go before its 
banking sector is fully developed. The same pattern is also seen in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), which like India has a largely state-owned/controlled financial sector. Other 
emerging East Asia markets have seen a decline in banking assets as a percentage of GDP 










                                         Figure 2: Equity Market Capitalization (% of GDP) 
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                                               Figure 3: Bank Assets (% of GDP) 
 
02 04 06 08 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 0 1 6 0













Sources: AsianBondsOnline; Reserve Bank of India; International Financial  






The Indian bond market is, however, less well-developed. While having seen rapid development 
and growth in size, the government bond market remains largely illiquid. Its corporate bond 
market remains restricted in regards to participants, largely arbitrage-driven (as opposed to 
driven by strategic needs of issuers) and also highly illiquid. The lack of development is 
anomalous for two reasons: First, India has developed world-class markets for equities and for 
equity derivatives supported by high-quality infrastructure. And second, the infrastructure for the 
bond market, particularly the government bond market, is similarly of high quality.  
 
Relatively weak development of bond markets is not unusual in the region, indeed in many ways 
the Indian market shows stronger progress—for example in the use of sophisticated and 
innovative tools such as collateralized lending and borrowing agreements—but it is the rapid 
development of its other markets which is in such stark contrast to its bond markets.  
 
India’s government bond market has grown steadily—largely due to the need to finance the 
fiscal deficit—and is comparable to many government bond markets in emerging East Asia. At 
36% of GDP, the Indian government debt market compares well with the markets of its 
neighbors (Figure 4). In absolute terms, however, given India’s greater overall size, the Indian 
government bond market is considerably larger than most other emerging East Asian markets 
(Table 2). The need to finance a large fiscal deficit has stimulated issuance and growth of the 
government bond market. Since 1992, deficit finance has relied increasingly on borrowing from 
the market rather than the previous policy of monetizing the deficit. The government market 
comprises approximately 104 issues with a total nominal value of about USD364 billion.  
 
 
                                        Figure 4: Government Bonds (% of GDP) 
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Sources: AsianBondsOnline, Bank for International Settlements, and Reserve  






                   Table 2: India and EEA Bond Markets (in US$ billion), March 2008 
 
  Government Corporate  Total 
   China, People’s Rep. of  1,712.93  175.16  1,888.10 
   Hong Kong, China  18.41  74.96  93.37 
   Indonesia  77.23  9.13  86.36 
   Korea, Rep. of 450.49  570.48  1,020.97 
   Malaysia  101.30  79.00  180.30 
   Philippines  54.50  5.68  60.17 
   Singapore  74.93  55.87  130.80 
   Thailand  112.31  44.00  156.31 
   Viet Nam  10.76  1.56  12.32 
   India  423.97  45.79  469.76 
                          Sources: AsianBondsOnline, Bank for International Settlements, and Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
The corporate bond market is less developed than most in emerging East Asia, with private 
placements dominating. At 3.9% of GDP, corporate bonds are comparable to levels in the 
Philippines and Indonesia, where corporate finance is less well-developed, as well as with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Viet Nam, where state-ownership remains dominant 
(Figure 5). That said, corporate bond markets remain small in much of the region with the 
exception of the Republic of Korea (Korea) and Hong Kong, China. Even in absolute terms 
India’s corporate bond market is minuscule in relation to its economic size. The role of various 
sources of corporate finance demonstrates that there is no single model for corporate finance—
some economies rely more heavily on equity finance, while others more on bank finance. 
However, few rely so little on corporate bonds as India does. 
                                              
                                             Figure 5: Corporate Bonds (% of GDP) 
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    Sources: AsianBondsOnline, Bank for International Settlements, and Reserve 
           Bank of India.  
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The turnover ratio for government bonds is lower than in most markets in emerging East Asia—
the corporate ratio compares well, but the small number of outstanding bonds means the 
secondary market is small and illiquid. The turnover ratio for Indian government bonds, in 2007 
was 104%, meaning that, on average, government bonds changed hands slightly more than 
once a year.
3  Although some caution is necessary when making international comparisons 
because of differing methodologies,
4 government bond market turnover ratios in other emerging 
East Asian markets were higher (Figure 6). Ratios in Korea, PRC, and Indonesia were around 
150% in 2007; in Malaysia the ratio exceeded 250% and Thailand over 350% (albeit an 
unusually high figure for Thailand reflecting unusual political circumstances). Elsewhere, the 
ratio in Japan is over 500%, in Australia over 600%, while the US; Canada; and Taipei,China 
have ratios well over 2,000%. Hong Kong, China had a ratio of over 9,000% in 2007. 
 
 
                                         Figure 6: India and EEA Government Securities  
                                         Turnover (% Average Outstanding) 
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    Data for India for June 2008 covers January to March 2008 only. 
    Sources: AsianBondsOnline, Reserve Bank of India and Clearing Corporation of  










                                                           
3  Turnover ratio is calculated as 12 months trading as a percentage of market capitalization. 
4  Indian banks and some other investors are required to hold a certain percent of their assets in government bonds. These 
holdings can be traded but arguably the “free float” of Indian government bonds is likely to be quite low, hence the caution of 
too much reliance on turnover ratios.  
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Government bond turnover fell away from a peak in 2003 but has since recovered and is 
currently rising on a strong but volatile trend. Turnover of repurchase agreements (repo) 
continues to increase as more borrowers use them as a financing tool and is now considerably 
larger than government bond market turnover by investors (Figure 7). Illustrating the relative 
illiquidity of the government bond market is the low level of traded bonds—in the 12 months to 
July 2007 only 22 of the 95 bonds traded on more than 100 days and only 8 traded on more 
than 200 days. (Table 3). Liquidity is clearly concentrated in a few bonds and does not extend 
along the length of the yield curve, which has emerged over a spectrum of 30 years. It is highly 
concentrated in 10-year issues (bonds maturing in 2016–17 comprised 50% of all trading) and 
5-year issues (bonds maturing in 2010–12 were 20% of all trading). 
 












                              Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
                               Table 3: Government Bonds – Days Traded  
                                (Aug 2007 – July 2008) 
 
   Days Traded  Number of Stocks 
     Over 200  8 
     150-199  6 
     100-149  8 
     50-99  18 
     25-49  8 
     Below 25  27 
     0  20 
     Total  95 
                                          Source: Clearing Corporation of India Ltd.  
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Until 2007, information on Indian corporate bond market turnover was incomplete and largely 
anecdotal. In 2007, however, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) launched 
initiatives to ensure more comprehensive reporting of the over-the-counter (OTC) bond market 
(Figure 8). Current volumes are running at low levels—around 140 transactions amounting to 
about USD80 million per day. But corporate bond markets worldwide are typically illiquid,
5 so it 
may be overly optimistic to expect India to develop a uniquely liquid corporate bond market. 
Nonetheless, a more liquid market should eventually contribute to lower costs of capital for 
issuers. India’s corporate turnover ratio is quite high at 70% in 2007, comparing favorably with 
most other emerging East Asian corporate bond markets (Figure 9). However the small total of 
outstanding corporate bonds in India means that the secondary market is small and relatively 
illiquid, irrespective of the turnover ratio. The same is also true for the PRC, which has a high 
turnover ratio and a very small value of corporate bonds outstanding (relative to GDP). 
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5  Corporate bond markets even in developed markets—for example the Eurobond market— are notoriously illiquid with most 
bonds only trading actively for a brief period after issue and around the time of significant events, such as re-rating or 
redemption. They also tend to be institutional markets, so such trading as occurs tends to be in large blocks, putting further 




                                         Figure 9: Indian and EEA Corporate Bonds  
                                         Turnover (% of Average Outstanding) 
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    Data for India for June 2008 covers January to March 2008 only. 
 






















Box 1: Reforming Finance for Development 
Economic growth in India has picked up in recent years, and like other integrating Asian economies, it 
too requires large amounts of efficiently intermediated capital to sustain its development. However, an 
important constraint to financial reform has been dealing with the vestiges of financial “repression”—
deliberate policies that crowd out the private sector from credit markets and limit the ability of financial 
markets to develop as intermediaries for saving.  
 
Years of deficit financing have led to large-scale intervention and state ownership of financial 
intermediation. High statutory reserve requirements, extensive directed lending to priority sectors 
(including mandatory holdings of government securities by banks), regulated interest rates, credit 
ceilings, and other controls are examples.   
 
Financial Market Liberalization 
Reforming and liberalizing financial markets began in the wake of the country’s 1991 balance-of-
payments crisis. The thrust of these reforms was to promote a diversified, efficient and competitive 
financial system, with the ultimate objective of improving the allocation of resources through 
operational flexibility, improved financial viability, and institutional strengthening. The pace of reform 
was, however, slower than those in product markets, partly because the introduction of stricter 
prudential controls on banks revealed significant problems in asset portfolios. Prior to the reforms, 
state-owned banks controlled 90% of bank assets—compared with approximately 10% at end-2005—
and channeled an extremely high proportion of funds to the government. Interest rates were 
determined administratively; credit was allocated on the basis of government policy and approval from 
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was required for individual loans above a certain threshold. Capital 
markets were underdeveloped, with stock markets fragmented across the country. The major stock 
market
i acted mainly in the interest of its members, not the investing public. Derivative markets did not 
exist and comprehensive capital controls meant that companies were unable to bypass domestic 
controls by borrowing abroad. 
 
Concerns over the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and its contagion effects further spurred Indian 
authorities to strengthen the domestic financial system. Reforms were, and continue to be, based on 
several principles: (i) mitigate risks in the financial system; (ii) efficiently allocate resources to the real 
sector; (iii) make the financial system competitive globally; and (iv) open the external sector. The goal 
was to promote a diversified, efficient, and competitive financial system which would ultimately 
improve the efficiency of resource allocation through operational flexibility, enhanced financial viability, 
and institutional strengthening. 
 
Banking Sector Reform 
Reform of the banking system has been gradual and sequenced, focusing on improved prudential 
control, recapitalization of public-owned banks, and the introduction of greater competition. Reforms 
have included the establishment in 1994 of a Board of Financial Supervision within Reserve Bank of 
India; substantially tightened rules on bad loans, and convergence of regulatory norms with 
international best practices. Various legal and technology-related measures have likewise been 
implemented, such as the strengthening of credit information and creditors’ rights, and the 
development of a dedicated communication backbone for banks. 
 
Work to introduce the new Basel II regulatory system is underway and a pilot project was launched in 
2003 to operate a risk-based supervision system. The introduction has, however, been postponed to 
2009 for banks with only domestic operations, and to 2008 for other banks as it takes time to raise 
capital. Enhanced competition has also been introduced by allowing new entries into the market. A 
dozen private Indian banks have been created and about 30 new foreign banks had entered the 
market and started operations by end-2006. Prudential reforms have been implemented. But while 
interest rates have been deregulated, controls remain in four areas—savings deposit accounts, small 
                                                           
i            A number of exchanges exist, the National Stock Exchange of India Limited (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange are the  
             two most significant stock exchanges in India, and between them are responsible for the vast majority of share transactions.  
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loans in priority areas, export credits, and nonresident transferable rupee deposits. The reduction in 
the lending requirement to government from 63.5% to 30.0% of bank assets has given banks greater 
lending latitude. Other measures include ending the RBI’s participation in the primary market for 
government securities and lending to the government; removal of the legal ceiling on the statutory 
liquidity ratio; and abolishment of limits on both the floor and ceiling of the cash reserve ratio, allowing 
RBI to alter these ratios depending on prevailing monetary and economic conditions. 
 
Banking sector reforms have been sequenced to correspond with changing regulations of the foreign 
exchange market. The government has allowed the exchange rate to gradually float (as opposed to a 
“crawling” peg), and full current account convertibility has been introduced, with de facto capital 
account convertibility for nonresidents, and calibrated liberalization for residents. Other recent 
measures include foreign participation in the Indian foreign exchange market, unlimited hedging of 
genuine foreign exchange risk, and the introduction of new instruments such as interest rate and 
currency swaps, options, and forward contracts.  
 
Capital Market Reforms 
Significant effort has similarly gone into strengthening India’s capital markets, particularly through the 
creation of various institutions such as the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992, an 
insurance market regulator in 1999, and a pension market regulator in 2004. The National Stock 
Exchange (NSE)—one of the first in the world to have a corporate structure—was likewise created in 
the mid-1990s. This has developed into the world’s third largest exchange in terms of number of 
transactions, with foreign shareholders approved to own up to a maximum of 26% (the amount 
allowed by FDI regulations).  
 
In contrast to equity markets, the government and corporate bond markets have been held back by the 
more restrictive regulatory framework. A number of reforms were introduced to the government bond 
market in 1992 when the price of newly-introduced bonds was set by auction. But it was not until 
2005—11 years after the equity market—that bond market became an electronic order limit market. 
Several measures were implemented to minimize risks in equities trading and to create a national 
market in stocks. These included the introduction of a clearing and settlement system, creation of a 
centralized counterparty for transactions, establishment of a modern depository system for stocks, and 
a shift from a relatively primitive carry-forward system to the introduction of futures contracts. Trading 
in derivatives on the NSE started in 2000—the Indian market is now the tenth largest globally for 
futures contracts on single stocks and indexes and the largest for futures on single stocks.  
 
As part of the package of financial reforms, commodity exchanges were also fundamentally 
overhauled. Starting in the mid-1990s, the commodity market regulator began to reform the domestic 
markets and while initial attempts were unsuccessful, three new markets were eventually created in 
2000 based on the architecture of the NSE.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, the Indian financial system has been steadily if incrementally deregulated and 
more exposed to international financial markets. Its rapid transformation has been accompanied by 
strong economic growth, increased market robustness, and a considerable increase in efficiency. 
Reforms are continuing with the development of appropriate market regulation and an associated 
payment and settlement system, as well as greater integration into global financial markets.  
 
The financial market as a whole, however, remains subject to a number of constraints that need to be 
eased if efficiency is to improve further. The level of bank and financial intermediation remains low, for 
instance, both with respect to lending and deposits, and most banks remain largely controlled by 
public sector institutions. While household savings are high, individuals generally prefer to invest in 
real assets and gold rather than in financial assets.  
 
A major challenge is thus to deepen financial intermediation. This can be achieved by further 
improving the environment for financial investment through better regulation, greater transparency, 
and generally stronger institutions and legal frameworks. 
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III.  Government Bonds: Reforms Proceed, Development Lags  
 
A. Key  Developments 
 
The government bond market has developed steadily—with an increased supply of bonds, 
market reforms, and infrastructure enhancements—while new fiscal discipline aimed at 
controlling the deficit may reduce new bond issuance. Indian government borrowing since the 
late 1990s has been large and has grown rapidly. Government deficits have also been large. 
The revenue deficit increased to 5% of GDP in fiscal year 2001–02. Since then, although the 
deficit appears to be more under control at about 2.5% of GDP, growth has remained strong and 



































        Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
The enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBM) in 2003 was 
the culmination of a lengthy attempt to devise a control strategy for public finances. The act 
requires the government to follow a strategy to reduce the fiscal deficit to less than 3% of GDP 
by 2009. Additionally, the government is required to produce a Medium Term Fiscal Policy 
Statement as part of the annual budget, in which it explains the sustainability of policies, how 
they are consistent with the FRBM, and to make projections for the current and following 2 
years. 
 
The discipline this has imposed has led to the possibility of breaking the upward momentum of 
the absolute deficit—though it has shown considerable volatility over the past few years. More 
importantly, the sharp acceleration in GDP growth since 2001 has led to a major decline in the 
deficit as a proportion of GDP. From its peak in 2001–02 the percentage has declined  
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substantially, and is now below the FRBM target for 2009. Despite the progress, however, 
government borrowing remains high in absolute terms and is highly volatile (Figure 11). And 
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       Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
The RBI operates the government bond market, and therefore acts as monetary authority and 
debt manager, as well as regulator of the government bond market and its key participants—
primary dealers and banks.
6 Other participants are regulated by SEBI, the Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Agency (IRDA), or the Provident Fund regulator. New securities are issued by 
auction, with primary dealers required to participate. Trading is a mix of OTC bilateral 
negotiation and an order matching system. Banks and primary dealers are the main participants, 
but other investors have access to trading. Some limited retail trade occurs on the stock 
exchanges. Bond holdings have been dematerialized, existing as entries on the books of 
depositories. India uses Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) and settlement is done on a net 
basis using delivery versus payment (DVP). 
 
Significant characteristics of the government bond market include (i) a large number of issues 
that can be quite small; (ii) a large proportion of electronic trading; (iii) the absence of bond-
related derivatives—while equity market derivatives are very active; and (iv) statutory 
requirements on investors.  
 
The government bond market has a long history and, consequently, a very large number of 
issues—of which many can be quite small. Each column in Figure 12 represents the total value 
of the government bonds outstanding that mature in the corresponding year. The splits in each 
                                                           
6  The trend in developed countries has been to separate the functions because of potential conflicts of interest and the 
difficulty of convincing the market that the debt management function is not using monetary policy to manipulate the 
government bond market. This discussion is occurring in India but a rapid change is not expected.  
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column represent the value of each individual issue maturing in that year. Thus in 2009–10, 
eight of the issues are due to mature. It is clear that at most maturities there are several issues, 
none of which is very large (or therefore very liquid). Other Asian markets have recognized that 
small issue size does not enhance liquidity. The Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia are 
continually increasing benchmark sizes to encourage trading. The Philippines, with a much less-
developed local currency debt market, aims to increase benchmark size to between USD1.0–
1.5 billion while, for example, Singapore wants to increase benchmark size to USD3–5 billion 
per issue. India’s issues are an average of less than USD75 million, with the largest below 
USD350 million—small by the standards of international benchmarks. The RBI has followed a 
policy of passive consolidation that reduces the number of bonds—the fiscal years 2007/08 and 
2008/09 saw the retirement of 14 separate bonds for the addition of four new bonds reducing 
the number of bonds outstanding by 10 to 95. However, of the four new bonds, only one was 
over USD2 billion, representing an international benchmark bond, while the other three ranged 
from USD250 million to USD530 million.  
 




























A significant proportion of trading is conducted electronically. The negotiated dealing system 
(NDS) allows a range of trading styles including anonymous negotiation and order matching. 
The order matching system is now the dominant form of trading approaching an unusual 90% of 
market share (Figure 13). Several markets have tried to initiate some form of electronic trading 
system for government bonds, but none have had as much success as India in attracting 
significant business. 
 
As with bond markets in emerging East Asia, India has no bond-related derivative market. An 
attempt to introduce interest rate futures was unsuccessful, largely because banks were only 
permitted to use the market for specific hedging transactions. By contrast, equity market 
derivatives have been highly successful in India and now rank among the most traded in the 
world. 
 
Mix of individual bonds maturing each fiscal year. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India.  
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       NDS refers to negotiated dealing system; OM refers to order matching. 
       Source: Clearing Corporation of India Ltd. 
 
India retains a number of statutory requirements on investors. Banks, insurance companies, and 
pension funds are required to hold 25% of assets in government securities. In contrast, foreign 




The Reserve Bank of India has introduced a number reforms since 1992 in an effort to move 
toward a more transparent and market-driven structure. The process of auctioning new issues 
was introduced in 1992, replacing the previous system whereby government issues were 
allocated to investors—largely banks and state-owned investment institutions. Until prohibited 
under the FRBM in 2006, the RBI frequently intervened in the auction, taking substantial 
holdings onto its own books (“devolvements”) to ensure the auction achieved the right price.  
 
1. Primary  Dealers 
 
Primary dealers were introduced in 1996 to support the auction system. Primary dealers may be 
independent or may be linked to banks. In 2006, the primary dealer structure was modified to 
allow banks to operate directly as primary dealers (separate primary dealer subsidiaries of 
banks were permitted to reintegrate into the parent bank). There are currently six primary bank 
dealers and 11 "stand-alone" primary dealers. Primary dealers have privileged access to 
preferential finance at the RBI through the liquidity access facility and through repos. Primary 
dealers are also given favored access to the RBI's open market operations. They are permitted 
to borrow and lend in the money market, can raise resources through commercial paper, and 
have the same access to finance from commercial banks as any other corporate borrower. 
Issuance is a two-stage process with primary dealers bidding to underwrite the issue and then  
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bidding for the issue itself. Primary dealers are assessed on their performance in auctions and 
in the secondary market. The auction process permits noncompetitive retail bids to be submitted 
through primary dealers.  
 
Models for primary dealerships vary across countries. The purpose is to construct a system, 
which provides primary dealers sufficient privileges to encourage them to undertake the 
obligations. The obligations are usually to bid in all auctions and to support some form of 
continuous secondary market. Privileges usually involve preferential access to central bank 
finance and some degree of exclusivity in the auction. But not all countries follow the exclusivity 
model. Thailand for instance allows major (government-sponsored) savings institutions to bid 
directly for government securities. Other countries allow institutions to make separate bids 
though these must be routed through primary dealers. The Indian model, however, where 





A “when-issued (grey) market” was introduced in May 2006. Initially, it was only permitted when 
the issue was a re-opening of an existing bond (one that was currently trading). The rules were 
subsequently relaxed to allow when-issued trading in selected new issuances (bonds that were 
not re-openings of old bonds). This is a relatively sophisticated tool which, while common in 
developed markets, is not common in Asia, with few exceptions such as Singapore and Hong 
Kong, China.  
 
Increasingly, issuers of government bonds have come to realize that transparency of issuance 
allows investors to plan their cash flows and investments more accurately. This prevents the 
market being distorted by temporary excess supply and ensures better prices. Most issuers now 
publish some form of timetable of forthcoming issues. In 2001, a published timetable was 
introduced for Treasury bill auctions but not for longer-dated bonds. In part, this was a 
consequence of weak control of the budget deficit, leading to frequent revisions in funding 
requirements during the course of the year. Since September 2006, the RBI has published a 
yearly issuance timetable for dated bonds. 
 
Indian state governments raise finance through omnibus issues organized by the RBI. State 
issues are not government guaranteed. The omnibus issues are sold at fixed coupons and 
prices (the same for every state). Potential buyers subscribe at the fixed-coupon rate for the 
bonds of a particular state (the amount on issue for each state is not announced). The 
subscription is closed after 2 days even if some issues are under subscribed. 
 
Current government bonds are fixed-coupon with maturities from 1 to 30 years. The RBI has 
experimented over the years with a number of different types of bonds. These include (i) zero-
coupon bonds; (ii) capital-indexed bonds (inflation-linked principal); and (iii) floating-rate bonds. 
None has generated much interest and all have now been discontinued. The RBI is now 






                                                           
7  Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (STRIPS) allow investors to hold and trade the individual 




Primary dealers are obliged to support the secondary market by providing continuous two-way 
quotes. In practice, until the prohibition on short-selling of government bonds was relaxed, it 
was difficult for primary dealers to meet this obligation and market opinion was that they did not. 
Short-selling was absolutely prohibited until March 2006. It was then relaxed, allowing primary 
dealers and scheduled commercial banks to run intraday short positions. In January 2007, this 
was further relaxed to allow short positions to run for 5 days. Market opinion is, however, that 
the remaining restrictions still pose a significant barrier—for example; the limiting of short 
positions to a maximum of 0.25% of an issue can be restrictive in the case of the many small 
issues that still exist. However, the direction of policy is clear and the barrier caused by short-
selling restrictions is likely to continue to decline in importance. 
 
4. Repo  Market 
 
The government bond repo market is open to primary dealers and banks, which are free to repo 
their non-Statutory Liquidity Reserve (SLR) holdings.
8 Repo-eligible securities are government 
bonds, Treasury bills and state government bonds. Repos are almost exclusively between the 
market and the RBI and there are few third-party repos. They are available for a range of terms 
but are mostly short-dated. In the current financial year to July (4 months) 72% of repos were 
overnight and 22% were for 2–3 days. The RBI uses repos and reverse-repos to conduct money 
market operations. Daily rates are announced and set a band between the repo and reverse-
repo rates, where the call money market operates. The volume of repos has grown sharply in 
recent years though less fast than the volume of Collateralized Borrowing and Lending 
Obligations (CBLOs) (Figure 14). The heaviest borrowers (of cash) in the market are foreign 
banks (46% in July 2008), public sector banks (33%) and primary dealers (18%).  
 
5.  Collateralized Borrowing and Lending Obligations (CBLOs) 
 
The Clearing Corporation of India Ltd. (CCIL), the clearing agency, operates a market for 
CBLOs—a form of tripartite repo (approved by the RBI) that allows market participants to create 
borrowing facilities by placing collateral securities (government bonds and treasury bills) at the 
CCIL. Borrowers can then bid for funds (up to their collateral’s value less a discount margin) 
through the CBLO system—a transparent, electronic order book. CBLOs are an innovative 
technique unique to India, developed to supplement and possibly supplant the bilateral repo 
market. Established in 2001, CCIL is India's first exclusive clearing and settlement institution to 
provide guaranteed settlement facility for transactions in government securities, money market 
instruments, and foreign exchange. CCIL, owned by industry participants, also manages bond 










                                                           
8  Banks are required to keep a Statutory Liquidity Reserve (SLR) equal to at least 25% of deposit liabilities.  
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     CBLO refers to Collateralized Borrowing and Lending Obligations. 
     Source: Clearing Corporation of India Ltd. 
 
CBLOs are offered for a variety of terms—most are overnight (75%) but dates out to 1 year are 
possible. The CBLO offers significant advantages over repos: (i) the instrument is tradable, 
allowing a borrower to reverse the position and repay the loan before its term expires; and (ii) 
CBLOs are considered secure because of the involvement of CCIL as guarantor of each 
transaction. This means (i) failures are rare, and (ii) CBLOs can be used by participants with 
lower credit ratings. 
 
There are currently (July 2008) 169 participants in the CBLO market. In July 2008 mutual funds 
were the largest lenders representing 74% of the market followed by insurance companies 
representing 11%. The importance of mutual funds has been a persistent feature of the market 
and is partly a consequence of SEBI rules limiting mutual funds’ use of fixed deposits. The main 
borrowers were public sector banks (46%), private sector banks (15%), and foreign banks 
(13%)—again a pattern which has persisted during the market’s life. The advantages of CBLOs 
have led to a rapid expansion of the market since its introduction in January 2004. CBLO 
volumes now outstrip repo volumes by a significant margin. 
 
CBLOs offer a number of advantages to the Indian market: 
 
•  Access is open to a wider range of participants than the conventional interbank market—
CBLO participants include domestic and foreign banks, mutual funds, provident funds, 
insurance companies, and primary dealers. The main requirements on participants are 
that they have a constituent subsidiary general ledger (SGL)
9 account for stock and an 
account with a recognized settlement bank. 
 
                                                           
9  Subsidiary General Ledger (SGL) is an account where market participant’s dematerialized holdings of government stock are 
maintained.  
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•  CBLO transactions are novated by CCIL, meaning that (i) CCIL conducts risk 
management and is able to guarantee transactions—in fact, the number of failures has 
been very small and all were covered by CCIL, with its losses small given the quality of 
the collateral and the use of adequate discounts; and (ii) transactions are anonymous so 
lenders and borrowers do not know each others’ identity—useful especially in uncertain 
times, when banks may be reluctant to lend to some counterparties. 
 
•  Banks are especially attracted: (i) securities held in any of the three types of holding 
accounts—held to maturity, available for sale, and trading—can be used as collateral for 
CBLOs; and (ii) the RBI grants limited exemptions from following cash reserve ratio (CRR) 
and SLR requirements to encourage the development of the market. Banks are therefore 
able to borrow more cheaply on the CBLO market. 
 
•  CBLOs are more flexible than normal repos (note that repos with counterparts other than 
the RBI are rare anyway), because they can be traded and hence positions can be closed 
earlier than originally intended if circumstances change. 
 
•  The collateralized nature of the instrument means that rates are typically lower than in the 
conventional call market. Furthermore, the fact that additional participants, notably mutual 
funds, can access the market reduces the CBLO rate below the repo rate. Recent figures 
show the call market at 6.75%, the repo rate at 6.4% and the CBLO rate at 6.25%. The 
security of collateral also means that the market is open to participants who would not be 
able to make unsecured borrowings at acceptable rates. 
 
•  The instrument is traded in a transparent, auction-based market, which is likely to lead to 
greater pricing efficiency and fewer pricing anomalies. 
 
•  The infrastructure requirements are small as the CBLO system is integrated with the 
existing settlement processes allowing Straight-thru Processing. 
 
•  Like all products that allow increased leverage, CBLOs and repos have the potential to 
increase systemic risk—so strong regulatory supervision of exposures is essential. In the 
current climate there will inevitably be concerns—especially from regulators—that easing 
borrowing, while it might enhance and develop the market, will increase systemic risk. And 
CBLOs are not immune from these concerns:  
 
•  The CBLO market removes some regulatory control since participants can lend among 
themselves without going through central bank repos. However, the RBI has been a 
staunch supporter of the CBLO market and it has a justified reputation for caution in 
relaxing regulations. 
 
•  CBLOs encourage a wider range of participants and potentially allow them to gear up their 
holdings of government bonds. However the risk management rules applied by CCIL limit 
the risk of default and normal regulatory structures prevent participants acting imprudently. 
 
While there may be legitimate concerns, there is no substance to suggest that CBLOs could 






6.  Interest-Rate Derivative Market 
 
Interest-rate derivative markets are OTC—there is no exchange-traded interest rate derivative 
market. India has a relatively active OTC market for interest rate swaps. The market is based on 
three benchmarks, but the Mumbai Inter-Bank Offered Rate (MIBOR) dominates. MIBOR swap 
volumes in July 2008 reached INR7.7 trillion covering some 12,000 transaction (turnover in 
government securities reached INR838 billion the same month). Foreign banks are the largest 
participants—69% in July 2008. 
 
In common with most other Asian bond markets, India has no bond-related derivative market. 
Previously, an attempt was made to introduce interest rate futures, but without success—largely 
because banks were only permitted to use the market for specific hedging transactions. By 
contrast, equity market derivatives have been highly successful in India, which now ranks 
among the world leaders in equity derivatives.  
 
Primary dealers in other markets use interest rate derivatives to hedge risks and optimize use of 
capital. Without derivatives, primary dealers cannot manage risk exposures and so must carry 
them on their books. This increases costs and reduces willingness to provide liquidity. Indian 
primary dealers are active participants in the OTC MIBOR swap market, but an exchange-based 
market would offer greater flexibility and lower cost. Discussions about reintroducing exchange-
traded derivatives have tended to focus on technical aspects, rather than on the main problem 
that limits the participation of banks to hedging.  
 
7.  Trading and Settlement Infrastructure 
 
The Reserve Bank of India has significantly enhanced India’s trading and settlement 
infrastructure. Until 2002, the secondary government bond market was a purely OTC telephone 
market. The main participants were banks and primary dealers with agency brokers acting as 
intermediaries. In February 2002, the RBI launched the Negotiated Dealing System (NDS). The 
NDS was designed to work complementary to the OTC trading structure, with the aim of its 
gradual replacement. In practice the NDS was mainly used for post-trade reporting of OTC 
trades. This brought about considerable efficiencies in settlement but had little impact on trading. 
 
In August 2005, the RBI introduced its Negotiated Dealing System–Order Matching Segment 
(NDS-OM). This is a screen-based anonymous trading and reporting platform enabling 
electronic bidding in primary auctions and disseminates trading information with a minimum time 
lag. NDS-OM has had considerable success and has taken a dominant share of government 
securities market trading. 
 
RBI’s success in gaining market acceptance for electronic trading is unusual and thus has 
lessons for other government bond markets. There is a strong preference among most 
regulators for electronic markets—largely because of the greater transparency and consequent 
greater ease of regulation. Increasingly investors have come to realize that electronic markets 
are beneficial through better transparency and lower transaction costs. Today, equity markets 
are almost exclusively electronic, though some permit a degree of OTC trading especially for 
large transactions or for illiquid stocks. 
 
Bond markets have been largely immune from this trend and trade largely OTC despite 
numerous attempts to encourage, push, or even force them on to electronic platforms. With few 
exceptions, these attempts have failed. Most markets, including India, have some form of 
electronic trading system for bonds. Typically these handle no more than a fraction of the  
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trading on the OTC market and are mainly used (if used at all) as post-trade reporting platforms. 
These electronic platforms are almost always spin-offs from equity trading platforms—based on 
public order exposure (for example, the Thai BEX system). The clear lesson is that the order 
exposure model that works for equity markets does not work for bond markets. It is worth noting 
the successful proprietary electronic systems—recent estimates suggest that 57% of the US 
fixed-income market is now traded electronically—are (i)  not public so dealers can ensure 
quotes are only shown to their preferred clients and (ii) are usually based on request for quotes 
and negotiation trading mechanisms. 
 
The RBI avoided the risk of market rejection by introducing the NDS as a non-mandatory 
supplement to the traditional OTC trading practices. NDS allowed post-trade reporting and 
considerably easier settlement. Only when this had gained acceptance did the RBI offer trading 
functionality under the NDS-OM system—which offers a number of OTC-like options such as 
“request for quotes” as well as order exposure. The result has been considerable success in 
moving the bulk of the market to the electronic platform, which resulted in greater transparency, 
greater settlement security, and lower costs. 
 
Government bonds are held in scripless form. Participants have SGL accounts if they are direct 
participants or constituent SGL accounts operated by SGL account holders if they are indirect 
participants.  
 
Real Time Gross Settlement for cash was introduced in 2004. Settlement of government 
securities is now 1 day following the transaction (T+1) using the DvP-III model, whereby both 
bond and cash positions are settled on a net asset basis.  
 
 
IV.  Corporate Bonds: Transparency Improves, But Development Still Lags 
 
A. Key  Developments 
 
Several changes have helped improve transparency in the corporate bond market, including 
better documentation requirements and improved credit rating. But it remains undeveloped with 
small private placements the norm. Four key developments have affected corporate bond 
markets over the past decade: 
 
•  dematerialization of holdings, as required by SEBI since 2002; 
 
•  increased trading transparency from compulsory reporting of trades. There are currently 
three trade reporting avenues for corporate bonds—SEBI began publishing trading details 
in January 2007; 
 
•  documentation requirements for private placements have been enhanced. Five years ago 
the term sheet sent out to potential buyers was little more than half a page and many key 
pieces of information were omitted or implied. Today, it is far more complete—market 
participants consider the documentation adequate; 
 
•  linking local rating agencies (of which there are five offering bond ratings) to international 




                  Table 4: Indian Credit Rating Agencies 
 
   Credit Rating Agency  Ownership/Status 
     CRISIL  Standard &Poor’s are major shareholder 
     CARE  61% owned by 3 major Indian banks (IDBI, SBI, Canara) 
     ICRA  Moody’s is a major shareholder 
     Duff and Phelps (India)  Subsidiary  
     Fitch (India)  Subsidiary 
 
                        Source: Agency websites. 
 
Authorities are examining recommendations for improving the corporate market, including the 
possibility of a uniform stamp duty and reform of issuance procedures. The Report of the High 
Level Expert Committee on Corporate Bonds and Securitization—commissioned by the Union 
government and chaired by R. H. Patil in 2005—made a number of recommendations for 
improving the corporate bond and securitization markets. The government is examining its 
recommendations on stamp duties, issuance procedures/disclosure requirements for public 
issues, and modifying the investment rules relating to institutions. SEBI now has a rolling 
program to monitor implementation of the key recommendations that are within its jurisdiction. In 
December 2007 SEBI relaxed the requirement for bond issues to be rated by two agencies and 
the requirement that public issues must be of investment grade. It also increased market 
transparency by requiring transaction reports (as described below) and publishing volume data. 
In addition, a number of minor enhancements recommended in the report, including one for 
trading conventions, have been implemented. 
 
B.  Factors Limiting the Further Development of Corporate Bond Markets 
 
1.  Most Issues are not Corporate Bonds but Private Placements 
 
In actual fact, although corporate bonds can be issued publicly, most issues in the corporate 
bond market are not really bonds but private placements, and most issues are not made by 
corporations  (Figure 15). Public issues are bonds offered to a wide range of investors and 
which conform to the regulatory standards required of public issues of bonds. They require a 
prospectus approved by SEBI, and have to be open at a fixed price for a month to allow 
investors—particularly retail investors—to subscribe Private placements can be made to a 
maximum of 50 “Qualified Institutional Buyers” (professional investors). And require much less 
documentation. The small number of investors makes it relatively easy to renegotiate terms. 
Typically, for example, a change in interest rates will lead to a renegotiation of the coupon on a 
placement during the currency of the issue. This makes private placements very flexible. 
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   Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
Public issues are rare because of excessive disclosure requirements—new SEBI proposals are 
designed to simplify the process. Disclosure requirements for public issues are viewed by 
potential market participants as excessive: 
 
•  Prospectuses for bond issues are reported to be several hundred pages long. 
 
•  Against international practice, disclosure requirements are identical, irrespective of 
whether the company is already listed or not.  
 
•  There is no provision for shelf registration—whereby a program of tranches can be 
covered by a single prospectus. 
 
The issue process is reportedly slow, taking several months, which, with high marketing and 
other costs, makes public issues very expensive. The slow process also makes issues risky, as 
the price is fixed throughout the offer period. In contrast, documentation for private placements 
is minimal, although requirements have been increased in recent years. Placements can be 
issued quickly with book building and pricing usually completed within a day. 
 
In line with recommendations of the Patil report, SEBI has agreed new listing agreements with 
stock exchanges—in August 2008 they were issued for public comment. Key features include (i) 
Companies publicly-listed on an Indian exchange would be required to make only minimal 
additional disclosures for a public issue or a private placement; and (ii) unlisted companies 






2.  Private Placement Issues are Small 
 
Private placement issues are generally quite small, averaging about USD20 million. Because 
private placements are quite small, corporate issuers tend to make several separate placements, 
sometimes on the same day. Because there are a limited number of investors available, the 
separate issues will all, practically speaking, go to the same lender, usually under similar terms. 
The result is that many of the “bonds” are actually syndicated loans—as the largest investors for 
private placements are banks. 
 
Corporate bonds are usually issued by the private sector, banks, and public companies. 
Issuance in 2006–07 was USD35 billion over 1,678 issues. Public entities accounted for 42% of 
the value and 8% of the number of issues. They were also relatively large, averaging USD107 
million. Private financial companies—largely banks raising money for lending purposes—
represented 35% of the value and 39% of the volume. Private, nonfinancial corporate issuers 
represented only 23% of value, but 53% of the volume, indicating an average value of only 
USD10 million (Figures 16, 17). Private sector and nonfinancial issuers—normally major 
participants in other corporate bond markets—are only a small proportion corporate bonds in the 
Indian market, in terms of value.  
 
 




































Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
3.  Demand for Corporate Bond Finance is Limited  
 
Corporate demand is limited for genuine bond finance (as opposed to loans disguised as bonds). 
Traditionally companies have borrowed from banks to meet financing needs. Bank credit 
continues to dominate corporate funding, accounting for 90% of financial assets, with state-
owned banks representing 70%—a declining but still dominant share (Figure 18). 
 
 














Capital, reserves and surplus
Deposits
 
           Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
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The main source of finance for smaller companies is from former “development banks,” which 
have emerged from state-owned development banks but are now private and profit-oriented. 
They finance themselves not through deposits—from which they are generally barred—but 
through debt issues. Development banks are active in the private placement market, borrowing 
wholesale to lend to smaller corporations. Private placements have dominated debt issuance 
and banks—even a single bank—will often absorb an entire issue. The decision as to whether 
to issue a bond or take a loan is determined by tactical, not strategic, factors: 
 
•  At various times the RBI has prohibited banks from lending at rates below their published 
lending rate—but the prohibition did not apply to investments in private placements. 
Therefore, a bank that wanted to offer a very tight rate to a highly rated corporate 
borrower would present the loan as a bond. 
 
•  Interest rate expectations may influence the choice—when rates are falling, as they have 
been for several years, borrowers will prefer a variable rate loan and lenders a fixed-rate 
bond. 
 
•  Large bank loans are required to pass an internal approval process, usually by the board 
or a board committee. Private placement investments are not subject to the same scrutiny 
(or delay), again, giving banks an incentive to grant loans but present them as bonds. 
 
•  Loans are not subject to stamp duties, whereas bonds are, making loans desirable for tax 
sensitive borrowers. 
 
•  Loans may be preferable for banks because they are not marked-to-market—this will 
change under Basel II rules, which are due to begin implementation in 2008. Bonds not 
held-to-maturity are marked-to-market. But, in the absence of reliable secondary market 
prices; there is scope for manipulation and window dressing.
10 
 
Similarly, corporations tend to regard loans and bonds as interchangeable. This occurs to some 
extent in most markets. But in India there is a strong focus on managing or arbitraging micro-
features. The level and complexity of stamp duty encourages the arbitrage-based approach to 
corporate finance so decisions are often tax-driven rather than strategy-driven. There is a stated, 
but as yet unscheduled, intention to reform the stamp duty, probably by introducing a standard 
national rate with a maximum rate, as recommended in the Patil report. 
 
4.  Companies with High Credit Ratings Dominate Corporate Issuance  
 
The distribution of corporate bonds issued by rating (Table 5) indicates that the number of sub-
investment grade issues is minimal and the proportion below AA is small—7.5% by value in 
2007–08. Only the largest corporations are likely to achieve an AAA rating. Others are thus 
excluded from the bond market and obliged to rely on bank finance. Recent figures suggest the 
proportion of lower-rated bonds may be increasing in particular the proportion of sub-investment 





                                                           
10  The Reserve Bank of India allows banks to hold bonds in “trading book”, “available-for-trading” and “held-to-maturity”. The 
latter are not marked to market under current rules.  
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Table 5: Distribution of Corporate Bonds Issued by Rating 
 
AAA AA  A  BBB  Non-Investment 
Grade  % of Total 
Number Value Number Value Number Value  Number  Value Number Value 
1999-00 35  83  25.9  9.4 25  6.1 7.7  0.8  6.4  0.6 
2000-01 38.3  76.6  33.6  10.1 21.4 11.6  3.1  1.3  3.7  0.3 
2001-02 31.7  61.6  33.5  27.8 24 9.3  7.8  1.1  3  0.2 
2002-03 45.6  76  27.1  13.8 18.2 7.5  6.3  1.6  2.8  1 
2003-04 50.4  77.5  24.8  14.9 17.3 6.1  6.5  1.1  1  0.4 
2004-05 56.7  72.2  22.4  22  11.8 3.7  7.1 1.9  1.8 0.3 
2005-06 54.6  75.1  30.8  16.7  9.4 7.8  4.4  0.3  0.8  0 
2006-07 57.4  79.5  26.5  16.0  9.7 1.8  6.1  2.7  0.4  0.0 
2007-08 39.5  73.1  30.3  19.4 19.7 5.7  7.4  1.5  3.2  0.3 
2008-09 22.0  76.7  25.3  14.9 20.7 4.3 23.1  3.3  9.0  0.8 
(4 months)                     
 
Source: Securities and Exchange Board of India. 
 
 
5.  Wholesale Trading is Over-the-Counter  
 
Wholesale trading in the corporate bond market is entirely over-the-counter, with some major 
banks acting as unofficial market makers. The declining role of brokers in the government bond 
market has led to their general withdrawal from the market. The National Stock Exchange (NSE) 
and Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) offer order-driven, bond-trading platforms that are used for 
post-trade reporting but rarely for trading. The exchange-trading platforms are mainly used by a 
small number of retail participants. 
 
6.  Delivery Versus Payment (DvP) Clearing is not Available for OTC  
 
Delivery versus payment (DvP) clearing is available for the few trades transacted on the stock 
exchanges’ dealing platforms but not for OTC trades, which are the bulk of the market. However, 
corporate bond OTC transactions are settled bilaterally between the counterparties. There is no 
central counterparty to start the process and so reduce settlement risk. In 2002, SEBI 
introduced regulations requiring corporate bonds to be held in scripless form. However, cash is 
still settled inter-office—sellers instruct the CCIL to move bonds before they have the funds from 
the buyer, so the system is not truly DvP, and sellers are at risk during settlement. This 
potentially imposes a barrier to trading. But because the market is limited to a small number of 
major players in practice, the risk is considered manageable.  
 
7.  Settlement Infrastructure Lags in Development 
 
If the market were to expand to encompass a wide range of investors, then it would require a 
better settlement infrastructure. SEBI is currently consulting the stock exchanges to introduce 
mandatory, centralized clearing and settlement for corporate bonds. It is not clear how this will 
affect the non-exchange market. But the implication is that it will apply to all bond trading. 
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8.  Repurchase Agreements are not Permitted for Corporate Bonds 
 
The RBI is the regulatory authority for this part of the market as corporate bond repos would be 
regarded as money-market instruments. The RBI has been considering allowing corporate bond 
repos for some time—and now may be moving toward permitting them. CBLOs have been 
increasingly taking the role of repos but limited to government bonds. Since late 2007, SEBI has 
been talking with RBI about corporate bond repos. Inevitably this is linked to the parallel 
discussions on settlement with the exchanges. 
 
9.  Conventional Securities Lending are not Developed for Corporate Bonds 
 
Conventional securities lending is theoretically available as an alternative to repos, but general 
market illiquidity makes it impractical. India does have efficient, automated securities borrowing 
and lending infrastructure for equities, which was introduced when “badla”—the indigenous 
carry-forward system—was outlawed in the early 2000s, but conventional securities lending has 
not been developed for corporate bonds.
11 
 
Other factors that have a limiting impact on trade include (i) tax deducted at source—which 
complicates trades between tax-exempt and non-exempt entities; (ii) no single database of 
bonds; and (iii) no universal conventions for day count or interest calculation, for example. 
 
 
V.  Securitization: Early Starter Awaits Take Off 
 
India began securitization early among Asian markets, with transactions going back to the early 
1990s. Growth accelerated from 2000, reaching INR580  billion (USD12.5 billion) in fiscal 
2007/08 (Figure 19). However, the securitization market has not yet taken off. Volumes tend to 
be low and asset types limited. Volumes appear to be mainly influenced by tax or regulatory 
arbitrage considerations rather than by underlying financial factors. The market is also subject to 
regulatory, legal, and tax uncertainties. 
 
Auto loans were the mainstay of the securitization market in the 1990s. Since 2000, residential 
mortgage backed securities (RMBS) have also contributed to market growth, though RMBS 
activity has slowed significantly during the last 2 years, as a focus on asset-backed securities 
(ABS) has claimed the biggest share of the market— in FY2007 accounting for 63%, followed 
by CDO/CLO at 32%. In 2007/08 there was a further shift toward CDO/CLO issues—
representing 54% of the total. Together with ABS (45% of the total) these two asset classes 
made up 99% of securitization volumes. 
 
Credit card securitization has been limited, partly because of stamp duty costs, but also 
because the credit card market in India—while showing rapid growth—remains small. There 
have also been limited future flow securitizations, such as toll receipts, and some infrastructure 
financing. Demand for infrastructure financing in India is now recognized and it is expected that 
securitization of receivables from those projects should expand rapidly. 




                                                           
11  "Badla" was a feature of most markets in the subcontinent. Essentially it involved the carrying over of positions rather than 
settling them—in effect, un-margined OTC futures. The growth and opacity of badla led the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India to finally ban the practice and force the unwinding of positions.  
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        Source: ICRA Ltd. 
 
As the nature of the securitized assets suggests, originators have mainly been banks and 
nonbank financial institutions. The originators include former development banks that have been 
privatized and which have become major players in the consumer lending market, and housing 
finance companies. ICRA estimates the top five originators account for about 80% of issuance. 
There has also been some securitization of corporate loans, again with substantial credit 
enhancement. These have included single loan securitizations.   
 
The preference for asset-backed securities (ABS) in India mirrors the pattern in Korea and the 
Philippines. Mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which are more significant in Malaysia and 
Singapore, have been less significant in India (Figures 20, 21). 
 




















Securitization was generally small in emerging East Asian markets in 2001, amounting to less 
than 0.2% of GDP, including India. By 2006 a number of the region’s economies—Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore—had expanded securitization levels considerably (to 
between 1.5% and 4.0% of GDP). In t Korea, Philippines, and Malaysia, they did this through 
policies designed to recapitalize the banking sector. In India, reasonable growth brought 
securitization volumes to roughly 1% of GDP. 
 
 


















A.  Banks and Insurance Companies: Predominant Investors in Securitized Notes 
 
Insurers are subject to restrictive investment mandates, and thus securitized assets are 
structured to achieve very high ratings and, often, to minimize prepayment risk. To gain these 
ratings, successful issues require very substantial levels of credit enhancement. Methods of 
enhancement have included (i) direct recourse to the originator (often structured as put options); 
(ii) originator or third-party guarantees; (iii) over-collateralization; and (iv) cash collateral and 
reserves. 
 
Until recently, securitizations with subordinated tranches were not offered in India and remain a 
rarity. This is because there is (i) little investor demand for such lower-rated notes; and (ii) there 
was no capital penalty for originating banks retaining the first-loss tranche. RBI guidelines have 
removed the latter reason and the market is now seeing some use of subordinated tranches. 
 
India currently does not have credit insurance or an active market for credit derivatives, 
meaning these risk management tools are unavailable for structuring deals and the use of credit 
default swaps to create synthetic securitizations is impractical. 
 
Regulatory responsibility within the securitization market is unclear. But the strong involvement 
of banks means that the RBI’s regulatory actions will have a significant impact. For example, 
RBI recently published regulations on the capital provision required for securitizations by banks. 
These are similar to, but stricter than, Basel II requirements.  
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There are several distinguishing features of India’s securitization market: 
 
•  As a common law jurisdiction, India does not require specific legislation to permit the 
formation of special purpose vehicles (SPVs).  
 
•  This gives considerable flexibility, but at the same time means that many features are left 
unclear until decided by case law.  
 
•  For tax reasons, SPVs are set up as single-purpose trusts, rather than corporate entities 
as is common in other jurisdictions. 
 
•  Arbitrage considerations are regarded as crucially important and the tax and regulatory 
environment helps decide whether to securitize, far greater than in other markets. As an 
example, the recent RBI rules on capital provision led to a number of direct assignment 
deals (that is, transfers of cash flows but without an SPV) since the new rules specifically 
applied only to transactions involving an SPV. 
B. Reforms 
 
The Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interest 
Act, which was intended to clarify the status of securitization, has been enacted, but is regarded 
as having had little effect. The implementation of Basel II may have an impact, and India plans 
to begin implementation in 2008. RBI regulations—which as noted are stricter than Basel II—
have encouraged more direct assignments (cash flow transfers without SPVs). The Patil report 
also made recommendations on securitization relating to the stamp duty and taxation. 
 
Developing a securitization market requires financial institutions that have an incentive to 
securitize and a set of standard assets to securitize. Financial institutions will securitize if they 
are (i) they need to reduce the size of the balance sheets; or if they are (ii) under competitive 
pressure. Securitization permits them to realize profits on their current assets by selling them. A 
securitization market also requires a supply of assets that typically can be securitized at the 
start of the market. These are the standard assets such as mortgages, auto loans, and credit 
card receivables, as well as infrastructure projects where future cash flows can be securitized. 
 
India’s banks have not felt pressure on their balance sheets so far—though credit demand 
suggests they may. Other entities such as auto finance companies have been active but they 
are small relative to the bank market. In considering which assets to securitize: (i) India is still 
developing its credit card market; (ii) auto loans are being securitized but the residential 
mortgage market remains too small for securitization on any scale; and (iii) India’s infrastructure 
demands are huge—but the main expenditure is in the future. As a result, there has so far been 
limited incentive for securitization. But this may change as credit demand and infrastructure 
expenditure increase. The use of securitization to finance infrastructure development and remit 
the cash flows could diversify the investor base for infrastructure debt. 
 
The stamp duty is a major barrier to the development of securitization. Transfers of assets 
require written instruments that are subject to stamp duty. Rates of duty on asset transfers vary 
among the states, but are generally high—most states charge between 3% and 16% on the 
value of the property being transferred. Tax uncertainty also remains as there are no clear 
rulings on taxing SPVs. Market practice and current opinion is that taxation of interest paid on 
SPV bonds will be levied on investors rather than being paid by the SPV. However, this has not 
been tested. There is also a general lack of clear regulatory structure. A legal amendment is  
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underway that clarifies the position of SEBI as the principal regulator for securitizations, 




VI.  Regulation Hampers Participation 
 
Regulatory responsibility in India’s bond markets is fragmented—and there is the perception 
among market participants that they are also at cross-purposes. Corporate bonds are regulated 
by SEBI, which is responsible for authorizing the public issue prospectus and for setting 
standards regarding private placements. It also regulates some of the participants—the brokers 
(who have all but disappeared from the market) and mutual funds. Other participants are subject 
to different regulators. Banks and primary dealers are regulated by the RBI, insurance 
companies (including the Life Insurance Corporation of India) by the Insurance Regulation and 
Development Agency and provident/pension funds by their own regulator. 
 
The bankruptcy system is time-consuming and inefficient, although the law is based on United 
Kingdom law and, as such, is judged to be reasonably clear. There are, however, (i) significant 
political pressures against declaring enterprises insolvent; and (ii) serious delays in the court 
process—several years is the quoted time for resolution of insolvencies. In practice bankruptcy 
is hardly an issue in the corporate bond market because (i) very few issues are rated below AA; 
and (ii) the terms of the private placement (and the small number of investors) mean it is easier 
to renegotiate terms if necessary, rather than to go through the legal processes for insolvency. 
 
Banks, life insurance, and pension funds are required to hold a minimum of 25% of their time 
deposit liabilities in government securities—the Statutory Liquidity Requirement (SLR). Only 
holdings in excess of the SLR requirement can be traded and repurchased. Bank holdings have 
declined as a proportion of total government bond issuance over time as interest rates have 
fallen and loan demand has risen (Figure 22). However, in absolute terms, 2006 was the first 
year in which banks’ holdings of government bonds fell. 
 
A.  Life Insurance Sector 
 
The life insurance sector remains dominated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). 
LIC now faces competition from private sector insurers but in terms of investment it represents 
98% of the market. Although LIC is only required to hold 25% of its assets in government bonds, 




































   Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
B. Pension  Funds 
 
Also, pension funds tend to hold a larger percent of government bonds than required. The 
pension fund sector is mainly controlled by various state-run provident schemes. A new pension 
system based on individual accounts is being introduced, though the time of completion has not 
been published. Life insurers and pension funds are also constrained by legal mandates as to 
the proportion of corporate bonds and to quality and rating. Like banks, these investors tend to 
buy and hold, partly because that is their nature and partly because of the lack of liquidity. The 
current structure of investors includes many with heavy state involvement. In addition 
competition is limited—for example in the low-premium life business. These investors may lack 
the incentive (and the skills) to engage in more active investment strategies. Bond mutual funds 
in practice invest mainly in short-term instruments to match the short expected holding period of 
their investors. 
 
The requirement to hold government bonds constrains liquidity by restricting the main liquidity 
traders to arbitrage transactions rather than directional trading. This means that the market 
tends to dry up in anticipation of a fall in interest rates because the natural suppliers of bonds 
cannot sell below their required holding level. It also ensures that the amount of government 
bonds held by mutual funds and other entities that are not required to hold a certain proportion 
of government bonds is small relative to the more static holdings of the banks, insurance 
companies, and pension funds. 
 
There is likely to be a movement away from government bonds over the longer term, as the 
New Pension System (NPS) is implemented and as the private sector insurance companies 
gradually chip away the dominance of LIC. However, unless there is a change in the mandates 





C. Mutual  Funds 
 
The mutual fund market has developed rapidly in India and is now almost exclusively private. 
Specialist “gilt funds” (which have access to the RBI liquidity facility) have been set up to invest 
exclusively in government securities.
12 However, the nature of the Indian bond mutual fund 
industry’s customer base—largely corporates using mutuals for short-term treasury 
management—means that the bond funds are treated as money-market funds and must invest 
mostly in short-term bonds and bills.
13 
 
D. Foreign  Investors 
 
Foreign fund managers wishing to invest in Indian debt securities must first apply to SEBI and 
gain an Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) certificate. Certificates are valid for 3 years and are 
renewable. FIIs in turn register individual sub-accounts for each investor for which they act. 
SEBI has introduced a number of reforms to smooth access for foreign investors: 
 
•  FII status is not open to individuals, hedge funds, corporates, or to fund managers; 
•  FIIs can now undertake short-selling and stock borrowing/lending on par with domestic 
investors; 
•  Registration has been simplified; and  
•  FII status has been opened to non-resident Indians (NRIs). 
There are currently 1,483 FIIs operating 4,474 sub-accounts as of September 2008. The 
number of FIIs has increased significantly over the years following the reforms—from 685 at end 
2005—though the bulk of these are active in equities and derivatives rather than bond markets. 
 
FIIs are also limited by SEBI in the amount they can invest and their investments are subject to 
monthly reporting. Currently there is an aggregate cap of USD5 billion of government debt and 
USD3 billion of corporate debt. The aggregate caps have been raised over time—twice during 
2008 (from USD2.6 billion for government bonds and USD2 billion for corporate bonds. 
Individual FII/sub-accounts are allocated limits within the aggregate total permitted. Individual 
limits are allocated on a first come first serve basis up to a maximum currently at USD200 
million. FIIs are required to fulfill their allocations within 15 days of the application being 
approved. 
 
In addition to changes in the quantitative limits, FIIs have been subject to changes in the 
method of assessment. In January 2008, the methodology was changed to include investments 
in bond mutual funds, which meant that the total invested exceeded the aggregate limit. FIIs 
were restricted from further investment until their aggregate holdings were reduced to conform 
to the aggregate limit.  
 
Although foreign investor access remains controlled, FIIs are increasingly important holders of 
domestic bonds and have become major players in equities. FIIs are allowed to invest in 
equities without any aggregate limit though subject to a reporting requirement and to maximum 
                                                           
12  Gilt funds, as they are conveniently called, are mutual fund schemes floated by asset management companies to invest 
exclusively in government securities. 
13  Corporate use of bond mutual funds developed when there was a tax exemption for income from bond mutual funds. The 
tax exemption has now been removed but the practice continues.  
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percentage ownership limits (24% for most companies, 20% for public-sector banks). At the end 
of March 2008, foreign investors owned 15% of the shares of the companies in the BSE 500 
(the main blue chip index). For comparison a recent survey has estimated that FII holdings of 
Indian equities were approximately 10 times the holdings of domestic mutual funds and indeed 
exceeded the combined holdings of domestic financial institutions, including mutual funds and 
insurance companies, retail and high-net worth investors. 
 
Generally FIIs are permitted to invest in derivatives (including theoretically in bond-related 
derivatives—though these do not currently exist). SEBI has periodically imposed limits on FII 
derivative activities when it appeared that derivative use risked compromising other policy 
objectives such as limits on foreign ownership. 
 
Historically FIIs have not been attracted to Indian debt markets. But the rapid economic growth 
and improvement of India’s sovereign rating have led to FIIs to become increasingly invested in 
Indian debt markets—both government and corporate. Again, corporate bond holdings 
exceeded the permitted aggregate total in January 2008 (albeit because of an unexpected 
change in the calculation methodology). At end June 2008, FII domestic debt holdings totaled 
USD3.87 billion, up from USD2.29 billon at the start of the year (the total permitted investment is 
USD8 billion). 
 
E. Investor  Diversity 
 
Arguably the availability of a wide pool of investors is the most significant factor in driving 
market development. Regulators often focus primarily on infrastructure and regulatory 
development—as these are relatively easy to improve and non-controversial. However, 
infrastructure and regulation are necessary but not sufficient to make a market. Rather, the 
existence of supply and demand from investors and issuers is the key requirement. The need 
for investor diversity is recognized by most regulators, but there is a tendency to see growth of 
the market as a substitute for diversity, which it is not. Merely increasing the size the market and 
the number of investors with similar investment strategies merely increases herd behavior—one 
that characterizes many less-developed markets. Nor is the lack of diversity in bond markets 
likely to be addressed by encouraging retail participation. While retail investors can provide a 
useful counterpoint in equity and derivative markets, their influence in bond markets is unlikely 
to be significant. 
 
Many markets have received a major development stimulus from foreign investors. Typically 
foreign investors are seen as a source of funds but they are also catalysts for more general 
development. Foreign investors are an important element in building investor diversity and 
encouraging participation tends to lead to significant improvements in the local market. There 
are many reasons for this: 
 
•  Most obviously foreign investors command extremely large liquid pools of assets and so 
can add significantly to local market liquidity. They operate on global strategies that are 
less sensitive to short-term local issues—making them valuable contrarian investors. 
•  They are likely to be accustomed to following active trading strategies in home markets 
and will try to do the same in emerging markets. Also, their global business means their 
trading strategies will be partly driven by external factors—such as exchange rates and 
comparative economic performance—which brings a new dimension into local markets.  
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•  There is also diversity in investment horizons. This particularly holds when local 
institutional investors are poorly developed—as is true in many developing Asian 
markets—and markets are therefore driven by speculative retail investors. However the 
willingness of foreign investors to take a long-term view is highly sensitive to the 
treatment they receive. Arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of foreign investors will 
encourage them toward a “hot money” strategy. 
•  Foreign investors often have skills and experience that are lacking in local markets. 
Exposure of local practitioners to foreign investors tends to lead to skill improvements 
and to better regulatory decisions. 
•  Foreign investors will tend to push strongly for innovations such as the introduction of 
derivatives—often they will have access to OTC derivatives on local assets traded in 
offshore centers. Unless local firms are permitted access to derivatives—ideally through 
developing a local market—they will trade at a disadvantage and so will reinforce the 
pressure from foreign firms. 
 
 
VII.  Rationalizing Regulatory Structures 
 
Rationalizing and consolidating the regulatory and supervisory structure of India’s local currency 
bond market could contribute to spurring innovation, economies of scale, liquidity, and 
competition. After years of strong economic growth, and financial market development, India’s 
financial sector is at a turning point. The regulatory and financial supervisory framework plays 
an important role in developing a vibrant, local currency bond market and financial markets 
generally. Streamlining regulatory structures to lessen regulatory inconsistencies, gaps, overlaps, 
and arbitrage can help ensure a level playing field by making players report to the same 
regulator regardless of size or ownership. It can also help regulatory systems adapt to 
increasing globalization and rapid innovation of new financial instruments. Substantial 
efficiencies can thus be gained allowing economies of scale, improved liquidity, and increased 
competition and innovation.
14 Recent events in global markets have also served to emphasize 
the systemic risks that can arise from inconsistencies between, for example, the regulation of 
assets with similar risks but with different types of entities. 
 
A.  Measures to Address Bond Market Liquidity 
 
Deep and liquid bond markets provide a safety valve when access to bank credit tightens—by 
providing an alternative source of financing. To address the lack of bond market liquidity, 
authorities could (1) relax exchange controls on bonds to facilitate investment by foreign 
investors and broaden the domestic investor base; (2)  ease investment mandates on 
contractual savings institutions that encourage funds to hold bonds to maturity; (3)  develop 
exchange and OTC derivatives and swap markets; and (4) consolidate the outstanding stock of 
government bonds.  
 
1.  Relax exchange controls on bonds to facilitate investment by foreign 
investors and broaden the domestic investor base.  
                                                           
14  There is no perfect regulatory system. The problems with Northern Rock in the United Kingdom are being attributed to the 
fact that the United Kingdom had moved to a single supervisor, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), with the monetary 
authority having no supervisory powers. At the same time, the Bear Stearns debacle in the United States is being attributed 
to the absence of a single supervisor. What is essential is effective cooperation between all the concerned authorities, which 
transcends the specifics of organizational architecture.  
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The restriction on foreign holdings of bonds is anomalous, in that it is more onerous than the 
corresponding restrictions on foreign investment in equities, on foreign direct investment, and on 
foreign investment in derivatives. The potential benefit achieved by allowing more foreign 
interest—especially trading interest—would encourage greater liquidity and investor diversity in 
the government bond market. Recently the RBI has repeatedly relaxed the restrictions during 
2008 substantially increasing the aggregate holdings permitted for foreign investors. However, 
indications are that foreign investors have not taken up the allowances of corporate debt 
available to them. The limitations and distortions in the market have forced some Indian 
corporate issuers with a global presence who want access to foreign investors have to issue in 




2.  Ease investment mandates on contractual savings institutions to hold bonds 
to maturity. 
 
Banks are active traders of government bonds but the SLR limit means that a considerable part 
of their stock of assets cannot be traded. The result is to reduce the profitability of the banking 
system. Institutional investors are the main support for corporate bond markets in most 
jurisdictions. Life insurance and pension sector institutions are subject to strict investment 
mandates, which means their ability to invest in non-government debt instruments is limited. To 
avoid the risks of a too-rapid easing of investment mandates, relaxation should be controlled 
and phased. The Patil Committee recommends using risk-based guidelines. However, such 
guidelines can only be useful when the relevant skill set within the institution is at an appropriate 
level and the historic data on risk is available.  
 
3.  Develop derivatives and swaps markets. 
 
Bond market liquidity is not necessarily about trading itself, but in using risk management tools 
to alter the risk profile of a portfolio. However, tools such as derivatives, bond lending and 
borrowing, repurchase agreements (repos) and swaps, as well as OTC credit derivatives and 
credit insurance, are not available in the bond market. Developing derivatives and swap markets 
is a critical measure for broadening the investor base and for increasing liquidity in both 
government and corporate bond markets. It is also crucial to funding massive infrastructure 
investment needs and providing corporations with the tools they need to manage the risks 
associated with India’s financial globalization. These markets allow a wider dispersal of risk as 
derivatives and swaps help reduce costs, enhance returns, and allow investors to manage risks 
with greater certainty and precision. Derivative and swap markets also help address exchange 
and interest rate risks. The development of these markets needs to be underpinned by 
improving regulatory, legal, and infrastructure frameworks.  
 
Discussions about reintroducing exchange-traded derivatives have focused on the technical 
aspects. It has been proposed that bond indexes—both corporate and government—be created 
and futures and options on the same be introduced along the same lines of what has been 
permitted in equity. The possibility of introducing exchange traded single bond futures and 
exchange traded credit derivatives is also being explored. In the February 2008 budget speech, 
the Finance Minister proposed to develop derivative markets by: 
 
•  launching exchange-traded currency and interest rate futures; and by 
                                                           
15  Foreign institutional investors are required to be registered with SEBI.  
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•  developing a transparent credit derivatives market with appropriate safeguards.  
However, sentiment in India has been moving against derivative markets—restrictions on 
commodity derivative markets and recent events in global credit derivative markets will probably 
reinforce that sentiment. 
 
4.  Consolidate the outstanding stock of government bonds.  
 
Despite some passive consolidation especially at the long end the government market remains 
fragmented with many relatively small stocks. There is now a budget provision to finance the 
consolidation of the outstanding stock of government bonds. RBI should thus move away from 
its policy of passive consolidation (which has not led to significant improvements in the number 
and size of issues) to a more active but market-driven retirement of small issues, with the aim of 
creating a limited number of large benchmark issues along the yield curve.  
 
B.  Measures to Develop the Corporate Bond Market  
 
Reforming stamp duty and disclosure for public offers are additional measures that can help 
develop the corporate bond market. 
 
1.  Reform the stamp duty.  
 
The stamp duty is a significant barrier to the development of both the corporate bond and 
securitization markets. Stamp duties are typically 0.375% for debentures and, as they are strictly 
ad-valorem, there is no volume discount.
16 The rate of duty varies depending upon location 
(various states have set their own rates). Recently official comments have suggested that 
individual states have agreed to waive stamp duties but this has yet to be announced as official 
policy. Rates also vary with the nature of the issuer; and with the nature of the initial purchaser 
(for example, promissory notes bought by commercial and some other banks are subject to only 
0.1% duty, compared with 0.5% if issued to other investors). Interest payments are taxable as 
income and capital gains are taxable. The Patil report
17 recommends that there should be a 
uniform low rate across all states and that the maximum amount payable should be capped. 
Plans are being drawn up to address this but the timescale is unclear. 
 
2.  Reform disclosure for public offers of corporate bonds. 
 
Issuers consider the current process expensive and risky. Existing regulations could be 
reformed to allow for disclosures that are appropriate for public issues into a largely professional 
market by entities that are already well-known to the investment community. Regulations could 
also be changed to allow techniques such as shelf registration.
18 The public issue process is 
also unduly long to allow for postal submissions—a recent proposal by the RBI to allow online 
applications might help by shortening the time an issuer is on risk. SEBI proposals, when 
implemented, should address some of the burdensome nature of issuance by rationalizing 
disclosure requirements especially for companies already listed. 
 
 
                                                           
16  The stamp duty on secondary market transactions was removed for dematerialized stock transfers in 2000. 
17  Report of the High Level Expert Committee on Corporate Bonds and Securitization (December 2005). 
18  A registration of a new issue which can be prepared up to 2 years in advance, so that the issue can be offered quickly as 
soon as funds are needed or market conditions are favorable.  
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VIII.  Conclusion: Learning from Neighbors 
 
As markets develop, there is a lot to be learned from sharing experience with other financial 
centers. While this is widely practiced in equity markets information sharing needs further 
development in the bond markets. Every capital market has unique features derived from history, 
culture, and legal structures, but increasingly they also have common features. Equity markets, 
for example, now almost all follow some version of an electronic order display and execution 
system. 
 
But too often, in learning from others, developing markets try to mimic the more advanced 
markets of Europe and North America. Structures that suit vast and complex markets in 
developed countries with greater variety of instruments and investors are less appropriate (or 
excessively expensive) for less-developed markets. There is thus a strong case for looking to 
neighboring emerging markets at similar stages of development for guidance. Doing so may 
suggest innovative solutions to problems that have been tried successfully in similar markets, 
provide support for local market innovations based on their success elsewhere, and allow 
markets to avoid other’s mistakes. 
 
India has developed a number of unique features in its bond market—for example its CBLO 
system and the successful electronic trading platform—which could usefully be studied by its 
neighbors, many of which suffer from limited repo markets or which have (like India) tried 
unsuccessfully to move bonds on to electronic platforms. 
 
At the same time, in the development of its corporate bond market, India can no doubt learn 
from its neighbors’ disclosure policies, bankruptcy processes, consolidation of government 
benchmark issues, and regulatory structures. 
 
Bond market associations are also less well-developed than their equity market counterparts, 
which benefit from  international gatherings and regional associations like the World Federation 
of Exchanges. The Asian Bond Markets Initiative could play an instrumental role in helping 
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